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Most cities have distressed neighborhoods where jobs are few and unemployment is rampant. Considering that the lack of labor demand in poor areas is a key contributor to local unemployment, a number of countries, including the US, the UK and France have responded by implementing spatially targeted policies to encourage job creation or …rm relocation to these areas. These policies-often designated as enterprise zone (EZ) programs-revolve around the simple idea that granting …scal incentives to …rms in distressed neighborhoods can boost local hires. Although intuitively appealing, enterprise zones are in fact rather controversial as many observers have questioned their ability to reach their objectives and whether achieved bene…ts are su¢ cient to balance costs (Peters and Fishers, 2004) .
In this paper, we provide an impact evaluation of the French enterprise zones experience, focusing on the Paris region for which there exists an exhaustive and georeferenced dataset of unemployment spells that allows for an adequate evaluation of the policy at the local level. The key measure in the French program is that, in order to be exempted from the wage tax, …rms need to hire at least 20% of their labor force locally. In the French context, this is a signi…cant incentive given that the wage tax-which depends on the wage level, the type of work and the work contract-represents more that one third of all labor costs borne by employers. The policy was thus expected to improve local employment through hires made by existing, relocating, or newly-created …rms drawing from the local pool of unemployed workers.
Our empirical strategy for the impact evaluation of the program is original in various ways: 1 The authors are grateful to a coeditor and a referee for their insighful comments and to participants at the following conferences and seminars: NARSC '08, EALE '09, ESEM '09, London School of Economics and the 2nd French Econometrics Conference, for their helpful comments, and particularly to Roland Rathelot, Shawn Rohlin and Je¤rey Zax. We would also like to thank the French Ministry of Health (MiRe-DREES) and the French Ministry of Labor (DARES) for …nancial support. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ‡ect the views of those institutions or of our employers, including the World Bank, its Executive Board, or the countries they represent. All remaining errors are ours.
We depart from the approach used in previous papers in the literature as we investigate the propensity of local unemployed workers to …nd a job. This is an appropriate, precise, and welltargeted indicator of policy success given the explicit policy goal of helping residents in distressed areas …nd jobs and given the existence of a unique dataset on unemployment durations and exits with observations at high frequency. Using continuous-time unemployment duration data allows us to focus on the semesters around the implementation of the program and distinguish short run from medium run e¤ects of the policy. This approach contrasts with other evaluations of enterprise zones which have usually focused on the growth in the local number of establishments or on the number of local jobs that were created as a result of the policy. But since job and establishment creations may also bene…t residents from non-targeted areas, such indicators can only be suggestive of the true e¤ect on unemployment in targeted areas.
Our methodology allows us to estimate the unemployment duration for each of the 1,300 municipalities in the Paris region, the municipality being the …nest spatial unit of analysis that is available in the data. Since municipalities have a population size which is broadly twice that of the enterprise zone they contain, this means that we capture the overall e¤ect in the EZ and non-EZ parts of a same municipality. Since municipalities are relatively small, however, we are able to investigate the possibility of spatial spillovers on neighboring municipalities.
Even though we do not have a controlled experiment, we argue that because policy makers selected treated municipalities on observables, matching techniques can be used for the impact evaluation. Moreover, while designation was indeed based on a criterion that included measures of population and labor force composition, political tampering implied imperfect targeting of municipalities so that some municipalities that were not targeted by the program have characteristics similar to those of treated municipalities and can be used as a control group.
As the existence of political tampering does not exclude other sources of selection on unobservables that would bias the results of matching techniques, we address selection issues in our two-stage methodology. In the …rst stage, we propose a new econometric approach to estimate local e¤ects while controlling for individual variables to avoid composition biases. To do that, we use a proportional hazard model of individual unemployment durations which is strati…ed by municipality as was originally proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999) and extended by Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2011) . This Strati…ed Partial Likelihood Estimator (SPLE) estimates the spatial e¤ects measuring the easiness with which residents exit unemployment for each municipality in the Paris region for each semester between 1993 and 2003. This procedure e¤ectively addresses two issues. Firstly, municipality e¤ects are purged of the composition e¤ects of the residents.
Secondly, right censoring that a¤ects unemployment durations is accounted for in the estimation.
In the second stage, in order to assess the e¤ect of the policy, we measure how these municipality e¤ects changed over time (before and after the creation of enterprise zones) comparing municipalities that host an enterprise zone (the "treated" municipalities) and other municipalities of comparable characteristics (the control group). This second stage uses conditional matching techniques to address possible issues of treatment selectivity (see Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009 , for a recent survey). Given our …ne control of composition and right censoring biases in the …rst stage, and given the way selection into treatment was implemented, we argue that, conditional on the variables that a¤ect treatment probability, trends in unemployment durations in treated and control municipalities would have been on average similar in the absence of treatment. The results of our empirical strategy prove to be robust to a variety of appropriate robustness checks including rede…nition of control groups (Smith and Todd, 2005) , rede…nition of the treatment status so as to capture spatial spillover e¤ects, as well as various weighting schemes and the introduction of other controlling factors.
Our results point to three main conclusions. First, we …nd evidence that the policy tended to "pick winners", that is to select municipalities in which unemployed workers face better prospects, a common feature in many EZ programs. Second, and more importantly, we …nd that enterprise 4 zones have a temporary and moderate but signi…cant impact on exit rates from unemployment to employment. At the time the policy was initiated, the average number of unemployed workers residing in municipalities that bene…ted from the enterprise zone program and who could …nd a job increased by a modest 3%. Since, on average, about 300 unemployed workers found a job every semester in each municipality in our sample, this means that, over a six month period, the policy only helped an additional 10 workers …nd a job. This is very modest in view of the cost of the policy. Furthermore, our results suggest that this positive e¤ect only occurred in the short run (at most 3 years) as we do not …nd evidence of medium run e¤ects between 3 and 6 years. Finally, the e¤ect on unemployment exits remains localized and no spillover e¤ects are signi…cant.
Our work complements an econometric study of the impact of the French enterprise zone program on the growth in the number of establishments which found that the policy had a signi…cant positive impact. This impact remains limited however when considering the large cost of the policy (see Rathelot and Sillard, 2009 ). More generally, the limited impact of tax exemption policies is also con…rmed by a general equilibrium analysis based on the calibration of matching models of worker and …rm mobility (Sidibé, 2011) .
The structure of the paper is as follows. The section following this introduction provides a survey of the literature on enterprise zones and presents the enterprise zone program in France.
We describe our data in a third section, and in a fourth section we explain our identi…cation strategy. In the …fth section, we present the results of the policy evaluation. A sixth section concludes and discusses policy lessons.
Enterprise zones: lessons from other impact evaluations
Enterprise zones (EZ) programs are territorial discrimination policies that consist in providing tax incentives and exemptions from regulations to speci…c blighted areas. The objective is to promote local economic development and, in particular, to improve the level of local employment through 5 incentives for …rms to invest, hire, locate or relocate to the targeted areas. Following the UK and US experiences, France voted its …rst EZ program in 1996, and implemented it the following year.
A comparison of existing EZ programs shows that the speci…c …scal tools that are used vary widely from di¤erent forms of relief on capital taxation to employment and hiring tax credits, or a combination of both. In what follows, we will focus on whether they can succeed in promoting employment by subsidizing labor (e.g. relief on wage taxes) which should have an unambiguous e¤ect on employment by strengthening the incentives to hire workers.
Nonetheless, several criticisms grounded in economic theory have been formulated. A …rst issue is that …scal incentives may turn out to provide windfall e¤ects to …rms who would have hired workers in any case, with little impact on the local level of employment. The e¤ects of enterprise zones could also be transitory only due to the exhaustion of opportunities for local job creation or because of the phasing out of subsidies. They could cause geographical shifts in jobs from non-EZ to EZ areas only although this need not be considered a failure of the policy if it is socially desirable to spatially redistribute jobs to places of low employment. Furthermore, in the absence of tax revenue compensation, enterprise zone programs may lead to a decrease in the local provision of public services, which in turn may render targeted localities less attractive for …rm and harm local residents. Lastly, it can be argued that providing only …scal incentives could be insu¢ cient to improve local employment when there is above all a mismatch between unemployed workers'skills and job requirements. Area designation could even result in the stigmatisation of the targeted neighborhood, further exacerbating the redlining behavior of employers.
A brief survey of recent evaluations
In view of the above arguments, whether enterprise zones successfully manage to improve employment may thus strongly depend on the speci…city of each program. Some implementation options may indeed be more favorable to employment creation than others (capital subsidies, for instance, 6 may have an ambiguous e¤ect on labor demand if capital and labor are substitutes in the industries a¤ected by the policy). The success of enterprise zones may also depend on whether the local context is conducive to producing results (the scarcity of land in targeted areas, for instance, may restrict opportunities for job creation). Whether studies …nd that enterprise zones are successful may also depend on the geographic scope retained for the impact evaluation as neighboring areas which could be a¤ected by spatial spillovers may or may not be included in the analysis. Spatial spillovers can be positive if workers in neighboring areas bene…t from the expansion of the activity in the EZ. This can arise from a higher labor demand in EZ or indirectly from agglomeration economies bene…ting to …rms in neighboring municipalities which may open additional job positions. A "positive"externality on non-EZ areas may also occur if the policy adversely leads to the stigmatization of EZ residents, with employers discriminating against EZ residents and becoming more likely to hire workers residing outside the EZ. Alternatively, negative spillovers may arise if jobs are relocated away from neighboring areas, or if some substitution of non-EZ jobs with EZ jobs occur.
These issues clearly make the evaluation of EZ programs a key but intricate empirical matter and explain the relatively abundant and mixed literature on the topic (see Peters and Fisher, 2004 , and Hirasuna and Michael, 2005, for recent surveys). The main usual challenge in such evaluations is to address selection issues in the designation of areas and this requires resorting to quasi-experimental techniques using panel data for instance to control for local unobserved heterogeneity as in the present paper.
In the US, both the econometric evaluations of state EZ programs already reported in the above-mentioned surveys and the more recent economic literature provide mixed results. We restrict our discussion below to the most recent studies on the e¤ect on employment which resort to now standard econometric tools used for evaluation. Elvery were rejected by the program (according to a competitive process) or which ended up designated only at a later date. 2 They …nd that empowerment zone programs had a positive e¤ect on local employment and a negative e¤ect on the local poverty rate. Obviously, the validity of these results hinges upon the comparability of selected and non-selected zones. This is challenged by Hanson The selection of those areas was clearly not random. Municipalities or groups of municipalities had to apply to the program and projects were selected taking into account their ranking given by a synthetic indicator. This indicator, which has never publicly released, aggregates …ve criteria based on the population of the proposed zone, its unemployment rate, the proportion of youngsters (less than 25 years old), the proportion of workers with no skill, and the so-called "…scal potential" 
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of the municipality or of the municipalities in which the zone is located. 4 Nevertheless, the views of local and centralized government representatives who intervened in the geographic delimitation of the zones also played a role in the selection process. After application of the criteria and consideration of local interests, enterprise zones ended up being large neighborhoods of at least 10,000 inhabitants that had particularly severe unemployment problems.
The …scal incentives were uniform across the country and consisted in a series of tax reliefs on property holding, corporate income, and above all on wages (see DIV, 2004, for more details). 5 The key measure was that …rms needed to hire at least 20% of their labor force locally (after the third worker hired) in order to be exempted from wage taxes (i.e to be relieved from employers'
contributions to the national health insurance and pension system). This is a signi…cant exemption that represents around 30% of the gross wage. Under the policy, an employer paying a worker the minimum wage (a net monthly wage of approximately 800 Euros in 1997) would be exempted from additionally paying a wage tax of approximately 340 Euros every month. These exemptions were meant to be temporary and were more advantageous for small …rms (i.e. for establishments with less than 5 salaried workers) which bene…ted from a 9-year rather than a 5-year exemption completed by a 3-year degressive exemption. The program was meant to last until January 1, 2002
but was eventually extended beyond that date.
Surprisingly, no evaluation of the French enterprise zone program was initially planned and descriptive studies which were subsequently carried out by di¤erent public authorities, yielded 4 The "…scal potential"is the …ctive local amount of taxes that would be collected if local tax rates were uniform across all municipalities in France. The formula of the synthetic indicator for a given area is the product of the …rst four criteria computed at the area level divided by the …fth criterium computed for the municipality where the area is located (see DIV, 2004). 5 Exemptions concern the speci…c following taxes: taxe professionnelle (business rate), impôt sur les béné…ces zoned for urban revitalization projects became designated as enterprise zones (moving from the second to the third tier of the zoning system of distressed areas). Using di¤erence in di¤erences techniques, they …nd that enterprise zones had only a modest e¤ect on the creation of establishments and salaried jobs. Our study departs from theirs in two important respects. First, we focus on the creation of the …rst wave of enterprise zones in 1997. This enables us to measure the whole e¤ect of the enterprise zone creation rather than just an incremental e¤ect of the territorial policy.
Secondly, we focus on the e¤ect of the policy on local unemployment rather than on local jobs (which may partly bene…t non-residents). To this end, we use individual data on unemployment rather than …rm data on employment.
Data and descriptive statistics
We focus on the Paris region, which roughly corresponds to the Paris metropolitan area. This region of 10.9 million people is subdivided into 1,300 municipalities including the 20 subdistricts of the city of Paris. These municipalities have very di¤erent population sizes that range from 225,000 residents in the most populous Parisian subdistrict to small villages located some 80 km away from the city center (Source: 1999 Census of the Population).
We use the historical …le of job applicants to the National Agency for Employment ("Agence Nationale pour l'Emploi" or ANPE hereafter) for the Paris region. This dataset covers the large majority of unemployment spells in the region given that registration with the national employment agency is a prerequisite for unemployed workers to claim unemployment bene…ts in France.
6 6 In the only study that we know of regarding registration with the National Agency for Employment, Blasco
It contains information on the exact date of an application (the very day), the unemployment duration in days, the reason for which the application came to an end, the municipality where the individual resides, and a set of socio-economic characteristics reported upon registration with the employment agency (age, gender, nationality, diploma, marital status, number of children and disabilities).
We use a ‡ow sample of unemployment spells that started between July 1989 and June 2003.
After eliminating the very few observations for which some socio-economic characteristics are missing, we are able to reconstruct 8,831,456 unemployment spells ending in the period of interest running from July 1993 to June 2003. 7 This period includes the implementation date of the enterprise zone program (January 1, 1997) and allows us to study the e¤ect of enterprise zones not only in the short run but also in the medium run. These unemployment spells may end when the unemployed …nd a job, drop out of the labor force, leave unemployment for an unknown reason or when the spell is right censored. Given the focus of the paper, we will mainly study exits that end with …nding a job, all other exits being treated as right-censoring in the analysis.
Regarding the geographic scale of analysis, given that enterprise zones are clusters of a significant size within or across municipalities, it would be desirable to try to detect the e¤ect of the policy at the level of an enterprise zone as well as on neighboring areas. Nevertheless, our data does not allow us to work at this …ne level of disaggregation and our approach retains municipalities as our spatial unit of analysis. Municipalities have on average twice the population of the EZ they contain. Any aggregate e¤ect at the municipality level will measure the e¤ect of local job creation net of within-municipality transfers.
and Fontaine (2010) …nd that 61% of unemployed workers in the French Labor Force Survey report that they are registered. The authors acknowledge that the true percentage could be signi…cantly higher given that their …gure is for self-reports and de…nitions of unemployment in the two sources might di¤er. In addition, the mobility of unemployed does not seem to be a key issue as discussed in Gobillon et al. (2011) . 7 We arti…cially censored the few spells which lasted longer than four years. This is because the assumptions underlying our duration model described below are unlikely to be satis…ed for very long spells.
Descriptive statistics on the number of unemployed workers at risk and the number of exits to a job are reported by semester in Table 1 for the whole region (…rst two columns). The number of unemployed workers at risk is nearly constant from 1993 to 1999 and then decreases before increasing again in 2001. This is consistent with a sharp decrease in the unemployment rate after 1999. The number of exits to a job does not follow exactly the same pattern as the decrease occurs sooner, in 1996. Over the whole period, the proportion of exits to a job decreases from 11:2% to 7:2%.
[Insert T able 1]
We also reported in Table 1 the same statistics for municipalities whose size is in the 8,000-100,000 range as our working sample is restricted to that range in the policy evaluation section. 8 It contains all treated municipalities and comprises at this stage 271 municipalities (258 controls and 13 treatments). There are no noticeable di¤erences between this restricted sample and the full sample. Roughly speaking, an average of 90,000 unemployed workers …nd a job each semester and this corresponds to about 300 exits per semester in each municipality. In view of these …gures, we chose semesters as the time intervals in our analysis since using shorter periods would have implied too much variability due to small sample size.
The raw data used in the evaluation of the EZ program are described in Figure 1 . This …gure reports the evolution of the exit rates in the sample of treated municipalities and in three control groups: a sample composed by non-treated municipalities between 8,000 and 100,000, and two subsamples of that group made of municipalities located at a distance within 5 kilometers, or within a band of 5 to 10 kilometers around an EZ. For readability, we drew a vertical line at 8 The reason for excluding the municipalities over 100,000 inhabitants is that this group includes Paris inner districts and one close neighbor, Boulogne-Billancourt, which are at no risk of being selected because of their a-uence. We chose the lower bound of 8,000 as it allows us to include neighbors of treated municipalities under di¤erent de…nitions of the control group. We do not know the identity of applicants to the program who were not selected.
13 semester 8 (…rst semester of 1997) when the policy started to be implemented. The curves for the control groups are broadly decreasing and exhibit parallel trends throughout the period. The curve for the treatment group slightly diverges from the trends observed for the control municipalities between semesters 1 and 12 (second semester of 1993 to …rst semester of 1999). In particular, the exit rate to a job remains ‡at in the treatment group between semesters 7 and 8 (second semester of 1996 and …rst semester of 1997) when the policy enters into e¤ect whereas it is decreasing in the control groups. The estimation of the treatment parameter that we undertake in the remaining sections of the paper is a way of formalizing and testing that these diverging trends are statistically signi…cant.
None of these di¤erences appears in the evolution of exit rates to non-employment and the evolution of exit rates for unknown reasons (see our working paper, Gobillon, Magnac and Selod, 2010).
Lastly, Figure 2 represents the evolution of exit rates to a job, distinguishing between two groups of municipalities depending on the share of their population residing in the enterprise zone. The " ‡attening" e¤ect between semester 7 (before treatment) and semester 8 (after treatment) which was noticeable in Figure 1 , is much more pronounced in municipalities in which the enterprise zone hosts a larger fraction of the population. As a matter of fact, rates of exit to a job even increased in those municipalities. This is suggestive of a local e¤ect on unemployment spells that is more concentrated in EZs than in the non-EZ parts of the same municipalities.
[Insert F igure 2 ]
The identi…cation strategy
As our raw data consists of individual unemployment spells observed over time, we rely on a two-stage approach to measure the e¤ect of the EZ program. In a …rst stage, we start by esti-14 mating semester-speci…c municipality e¤ects on the propensity to …nd a job while netting out the economic conditions (using calendar time e¤ects) and the e¤ects of observed individual characteristics (gender, age, nationality, diploma, family structure, disability). These municipality e¤ects measure the chances of …nding a job for unemployed workers in each municipality during each semester over the period, all other things being equal. In a second stage, we then resort to various evaluation techniques to compare the evolution of these estimated municipality e¤ects before and after the implementation of the policy between treated municipalities and various control groups of other municipalities.
Our identi…cation strategy for the causal e¤ects of EZs on the propensity of unemployed workers located in treated municipalities to …nd a job relies on constructing data at the municipality level that measure the easiness with which residents exit from unemployment. The use of individual data in the estimation of municipality e¤ects allows to control for municipality composition e¤ects and to account for right censoring. Our approach aims at reducing the extent of the correlation between municipality unobservables in the trends of unemployment exits and municipality unobservables a¤ecting selection into treatment. This in turn justi…es our empirical strategy in the second stage that is based on the assumption that treated municipalities are selected on observables only. We also check that our results are robust to key issues such as the variation in the de…nition of control groups, a change in the periods of observation, a change in the weighting scheme or the selection of observations according to propensity scores, the inclusion of various additional variables such as entry rates or lagged endogeneous variables, and …nally the presence of placebo e¤ects.
To implement this strategy, we …rst brie ‡y explain how we estimate the semester-speci…c municipality e¤ects and discuss the arguments underlying our de…nition of treatment and control groups. Our parameter of interest being the average treatment on the treated, we then explicit our identifying restrictions and our estimation strategy.
Estimating the municipality e¤ects
We follow the approach described in the methodology paper (Gobillon et al., 2011) which extended the set-up proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999) of Strati…ed Partial Likelihood Estimation (SPLE) to the estimation of unemployment duration models. It used a single ‡ow sample and as its main empirical result, decomposed the variance of local e¤ects explaining unemployment duration in terms of various factors such as education and nationality. In the present paper in contrast, we apply this methodology to a policy impact evaluation, relying on 20 semester speci…c samples to estimate 20 semester speci…c e¤ects for each municipality (7 semesters before and 13 after the policy implementation).
We start from the speci…cation of the proportional hazard model of the duration d of an unemployment spell until an exit to a job:
in which X i are individual covariates and calendar time dummies, j(i) is the municipality of residence for individual i, parameters 
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unemployed workers to …nd a job in each municipality j in each semester s. 
De…nitions of treatment and control groups
We estimate the e¤ect of the EZ program using various dates before and after the creation of EZs, and using various treatment and control groups. The treatment group is composed of municipalities which comprise an enterprise zone. In robustness checks we depart from this construction and distinguish municipalities for which enterprise zones represent a large section of their population (more than 50%) from the other treated municipalities. Later on, we also modify the treatment group by including neighbors of treated municipalities.
When de…ning the control group, there is a potential con ‡ict between two objectives. The …rst objective is to retain municipalities that are similar to those in the treatment group along various dimensions. The second objective is to avoid contamination of the e¤ects through spatial spillovers (Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and van Reenen, 2004). To address the trade-o¤ between these two objectives, we develop various empirical strategies controlling for di¤erent municipality variables and experimenting with di¤erent ways of constructing the control group.
We start by forcing the control group to comprise municipalities that are the closest to those in the treatment group in the space of characteristics and this includes neighbors of treated municipalities. Furthermore, population size has a very di¤erent support in the treatment and control groups since the non-treated group comprises many small and very small municipalities (less than 1,000 inhabitants) while the smallest treated municipality has 17,500 residents. To address this issue, as already explained above, we choose to restrict the control group to municipalities whose population is between 8,000 and 100,000. Moreover, we estimate propensity scores of being des- 10 Computing standard errors at the second stage might seem to be a tedious task. We showed however in ignated as a municipality comprising an EZ and then restrict the control group to contain only municipalities whose estimated propensity score belongs to the same support as that of treated municipalities. Note that this selection changes the de…nition of the treatment parameter of interest which now refers to municipalities which have ultimately been included in the working sample.
Moreover, it is important to note that the probability of treatment for a given municipality is never 0 or 1 for several reasons. First, we use municipality rather than neighborhood characteristics, second the selection indicator calculated by public authorities to select EZ was not publicly released and …nally the designation process was imperfect. Since political actors had a say in the designation of enterprise zones, the selection process was only partly based on the ranking according to the aggregate indicator. It also depended on political in ‡uence and on the desire of policy makers to spread out enterprize zones throughout the region. Both reasons make it easier to …nd control municipalities whose characteristics are similar to those that are treated.
Identi…cation and Estimation of the Policy E¤ect
We can now turn to the de…nition of the impact of enterprise zones on the semester speci…c municipality e¤ects j s estimated in the …rst stage described above. These e¤ects measure the facility with which the unemployed …nd a job in municipality j at semester s. We distinguish semesters before the creation of enterprise zones (i.e. between the second semester of 1993 and the second semester of 1996) that we generically denote s 0 and semesters after the creation of 
The average e¤ect of enterprise zone designation on unemployment exits in municipalities which include enterprise zones after 1997-i.e. the average treatment on the treated-is given by:
This e¤ect is not directly estimable since the term E ln 
where is the …rst di¤erence operator, variable Z Finally, we also used weights to account for the diversity of municipalities. A natural weight to be used is the (square root of the) number of unemployed workers in the municipality at the beginning of each semester. We also checked the robustness of the results using alternative weights such as the inverse of the estimated standard error of the estimate [ ln 
Describing the treated municipalities: the propensity score
We now describe the municipality characteristics that determine the creation of an enterprise zone and that will allow us to construct the propensity score. We estimate a Probit model of EZ designation as a function of municipality control variables among which are measures of physical job accessibility, the municipal composition of the population in terms of nationality or education, the rate of unemployment, the proportion of young adults, and household income (proxying for the …scal potential). We also include in the speci…cation the smallest distance to another municipality comprising an enterprise zone. This is to account for the will of authorities to distribute enterprise zones more or less evenly throughout the region. 11 Results of weighted Probit estimations where the weights are the (square root of the) number of unemployed workers in the municipality are reported in Table 2 .
The results of our benchmark weighted Probit speci…cation in which weights are the (square root of the) number of unemployed workers in the municipality appear in the …rst column of Table   2 although less parsimonious speci…cations were also estimated (see the notes below this Table) .
Unweighted estimation results are very similar (column 3).
[Insert T able 2]
In line with the selection criteria, the larger the average household income in the municipality or the smaller the proportion of persons without a high school diploma in the municipality, the less likely the municipality comprises an enterprise zone although the latter e¤ect is hardly signi…cant. The higher the proportion of individuals below 25 years of age or the larger the size of the population, the larger the probability that the municipality contains an enterprise zone. In terms of distance, the larger the distance to a designated municipality or the larger the density of jobs attainable in less than 60 minutes by private vehicle, the less likely it is that the municipality will be endowed with an enterprise zone. This is consistent with the targeting of places with relatively lower job accessibility. The distance to the nearest EZ is not signi…cant. In line with Hanson (2009), we also experimented with political variables which are the frequencies of votes for political parties.
Even though municipalities whose townhalls were administered by politicians belonging to the governing party at the time of EZ designation were more likely to be selected, the e¤ect is not signi…cant and we chose not to include these variables in the …nal speci…cation.
We also experimented with an alternative whose results are reported in the second column of Table 2 . We included a variable equal to the endogenous outcome (i.e. the municipality e¤ects) averaged over semesters prior to policy implementation. The e¤ect is positive although it is at the limit of signi…cance. This means that municipalities chosen to include an enterprise zone are also those where it is easier for unemployed workers to …nd a job holding constant the characteristics that explain the treatment. This is a standard result in the evaluation literature where governments often intervene to "pick winners" (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996) .
Using the results in the …rst column, we predict the propensity score for each municipality.
It interestingly reveals that the supports of the predicted propensity scores in the treated and control groups di¤er quite markedly as shown in Table 3 .
[Insert T able 3]
The smallest predicted probability in the treatment group is equal to 0.08%, a low score which is consistent with political tampering in designation. In order to satisfy the common support condition (Smith and Todd, 2005), we further restrict the control group to municipalities whose predicted propensity scores are larger than the value 0.04% (see Table 3 ). This restriction shrinks the control group by a factor of 2 and it now includes 135 municipalities (instead of 258), which is about ten times the number of treated municipalities (13) . We will later test the robustness of our results to more or less restrictive selections.
Using this allocation, we computed the averages of explanatory variables in the treatment and control groups to assess whether those groups are balanced and we report these averages in Table   4 .
[Insert T able 4]
Since the treatment group is small, it seems di¢ cult to report these averages in strata de…ned by the propensity score levels (Smith and Todd, 2005) . We rather report them globally even if results are less easy to interpret. The covariates of interest seem to be balanced in the two subsamples except for two variables: the proportion of college graduates and household income. This explains the di¤erences in the propensity score averages between the control and treatment group.
Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient of designated municipalities in linear regressions of those covariates on the propensity score and the designation indicator is not signi…cant even at the 10% level which indicates that samples are approximately balanced.
The evaluation of the policy
A useful benchmark for our evaluation is the estimated treatment e¤ect obtained when using as outcome variable the raw entry rates into unemployment as in Papke (1994) and the three raw exit rates from unemployment (i.e. the rates of exit to a job, to non-employment or to an unknown reason) that we are able to construct from our data. The entry rate (resp. an exit rate) is de…ned as the number of unemployed workers entering (resp. exiting) in a given semester divided by the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of the period. The results using raw rates should be compared with those obtained when applying our more sophisticated method that purges exit rates to a job from individual characteristics and takes into account the usual censorships that a¤ect unemployment data. This is a useful benchmark since policy analysts often resort to raw rates for policy evaluation. Table 5 reports the estimation results of the random growth equation (3) using raw rates correcting for the within-municipality autocorrelation of shocks between semesters by FGLS using a constant unrestricted within-municipality covariance matrix.
[Insert T able 5]
In column 1, the parameter which measures the e¤ect of the treatment on the log-entry rates in unemployment is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Column 2 reports the e¤ect of the treatment on the log-exit rates out of unemployment to a job, our parameter of interest. It is signi…cantly positive and equal to .040. The other raw exit rates are not signi…cantly a¤ected by the treatment and this will be commented later on.
Using the same estimation method as in the benchmark, Table 6 reports our main estimation results using the semester speci…c municipality e¤ects purged from observed individual heterogeneity in the …rst stage as explained in section 4.1. We present results that we obtain when varying the range of semesters used in the estimations.
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[Insert T able 6]
The …rst column reports the results of our preferred speci…cation since this speci…cation is robust to various changes in the underlying construction and seems to be a conservative estimate. The estimated treatment parameter is equal to .031 and is signi…cant at the 5% level. This e¤ect is quite small since it implies that the rate of exit to a job increased by a meagre 3% when the policy was implemented. Given that there are roughly 300 exits each semester on average in a municipality in the considered range of population size, the policy amounts to generating about 10 new exits per semester only. This estimate is slightly lower but comparable to the benchmark using raw rates. This small e¤ect can probably be interpreted as an indication that job reallocation within municipalities may be relatively large, that there is possibly little substitution of labor to capital, and that any possibly generated agglomeration e¤ects are not favorable to hiring. 12 We do not report the estimated semester e¤ects which reproduce closely the raw trends in the data. Nor do we correct standard errors for the replacement of the true propensity score by an estimator which usually marginally a¤ects standard errors.
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In the second column we further restrict the period of evaluation, keeping only two semesters before the reform and two semesters after the reform. The estimate remains signi…cant and stands at .042. If we further restrict the analysis to the period at which the reform was implemented, the estimate is equal to .035 although it becomes insigni…cant, probably because of the smaller number of observations. 13 Interestingly, we can distinguish between treated municipalities according to the proportion of the municipality population which resides within the enterprise zone. Speci…cally, we included in our preferred speci…cation (column 1) an indicator that the proportion of the population living in the enterprise zone in the treated municipality is below 50%. The result is striking since the treatment parameter estimate is now equal to .057 instead of .031 and is signi…cant at a 1% level while the treatment e¤ect in municipalities in which a small proportion of the population lives in an enterprise zone is also positive (.016=.057-.041) but becomes insigni…cant. The dilution of the e¤ect will be con…rmed below when changing the treatment de…nition. It indicates that the e¤ect of the policy is very localized with probably little spillover outside the EZ, an issue that we further investigate below.
Finally, we tested for spatial correlation and its pattern is very irregular and certaily not signi…cant beyond 10 kilometers. Since correcting standard errors for the presence of random e¤ects at the level of the "département" (county equivalent) had a marginal impact, we chose to neglect these corrections.
Spillover e¤ects and changes in treatment and control groups
We now investigate the possibility of spatial spillovers on neighboring municipalities, which may be either positive or negative as mentioned earlier. We began with changing the composition of the control group. We selected municipalities in the control group depending on their distance to a treated municipality. We used "as-the-crow- ‡ies" distance between municipality centres and experimented with three distance thresholds at 5, 10 and 15 kilometers. We …rst restricted the previous control group to municipalities whose center is farther than 5 kilometers of the center of a treated municipality (respectively 10 and 15 kilometers). Second, we restricted the control group to municipalities whose center is within 5 kilometers of the center of a treated municipality (respectively 10 and 15). Table 7 reports the corresponding results.
[Insert T able 7]
The evidence of spillover e¤ects to neighboring municipalities is weak. In all but one of these experiments, the estimates of the treatment parameter remains around .03 and their standard errors remain constant. The only case in which the estimate becomes hardly distinguishable from zero is when the control group is restricted to municipalities outside the 15 km range of a treated municipality. In our opinion, however, the assumption (4) that these municipalities are experimenting the same trends in unemployment as the treated municipalities becomes unsustainable since labor market conditions in distant municipalities are likely to be di¤erent. These various estimations also con…rm that spatial correlation should not be an important concern since standard errors are in most cases not a¤ected by these variants.
We also experimented with changes in the de…nition of the treatment group. Instead of retaining the municipalities comprising an enterprise zone only, we also retained their neighbors at a distance of less than 2 kilometers (respectively at a distance of less than 3 kilometers). The number of potentially treated municipalities increases from 13 to 24 treated municipalities (respectively 51). Table 8 reports the corresponding results. It is striking that in both cases the estimated treatment parameter value drops by 2/3 and is no longer signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. It con…rms that the creation of an enterprise zone has a very localized e¤ect on the unemployment exit rate to a job and has no signi…cant positive spillover e¤ects on neighboring municipalities.
[Insert T able 8]
Other robustness checks
We also performed other robustness checks of our results. First, we modi…ed the whole procedure so as to consider in the estimation of the propensity score the role of the before treatment average of the endogenous variable (as in the second column of Table 2 ). Second, we varied the municipalityand-semester speci…c weights that we used in the estimation. Instead of using the square root of the number of unemployed workers in the municipality at the beginning of the semester, we either To evaluate the implications of our support assumptions, we change the lower threshold for inclusion of municipalities in the control group according to their estimated propensity score. We repeated the experiment and varied this (lower) threshold from 0.005 to 0.15 without a¤ecting the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient by much. We also experimented with modifying the treatment group by leaving one treated municipality out and re-running 13 di¤erent estimations.
There is one outlier in this experiment in the sense that if we leave this municipality out the estimated e¤ect becomes larger (.43) and very signi…cant. It is true that leaving out the largest propensity scores municipalities (see Table 3 ) can decrease by 15% the estimated e¤ect but it is not systematic. Keeping the 13 treated municipalities in the sample is thus reasonable and seems to give a somewhat conservative estimate.
Another issue is that although the construction of the semester-speci…c municipality e¤ects purges exit rates to jobs from individual characteristics, it does a poorer job at controlling for entry e¤ects because of identi…cation issues. We included yearly and monthly dummies in the …rst stage estimation even though identi…cation of these parameters could be fragile. To address the issue, we re-estimated our preferred speci…cation (see …rst column of Table 6 ) controlling for 27 semester and municipality speci…c entry rates. Although this variable has a signi…cant positive e¤ect, the estimate of the treatment e¤ect is hardly a¤ected.
Our estimates might also re ‡ect that some …rms delayed hiring during the last semester of 1996 in order to bene…t from the policy in the following semester. As suggested by Manning and Pischke (2006) to measure placebo e¤ects as well, we included in the speci…cation an indicator for the lagged treatment e¤ect. If the policy is anticipated and employers delay hiring decisions, a negative e¤ect could be observed. The lagged treatment e¤ect is found to be not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, suggesting no such behavior, and its inclusion does not a¤ect the estimated treatment parameter.
Evidence gathered in Table 5 Finally, the estimates of the treatment parameter for exits to non-employment and exits for unknown reasons reported in Table 5 are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero although the estimate for exits to non-employment is quite large at the same level .039. The result that exits for unknown reasons are not a¤ected by the policy is important for our identi…cation strategy. Our treatment parameter using information on reported exits to a job only would indeed be biased if exits to a job were concealed among the exits for unknown reasons in a way that varies between treated and control municipalities.
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Conclusion and policy discussion
In this paper, we conducted an evaluation of the impact of the creation of enterprise zones on the propensity of unemployed workers to …nd a job. Contrary to the previous literature which usually focuses on employment growth or on the local creation of …rms, our choice of outcome of interest was motivated by the fact that a main objective of the policy had indeed been to help locals move out of unemployment (and not just to create or displace jobs which may only have an indirect e¤ect on the local population). This evaluation was carried out for the Paris region, using an exhaustive dataset on job applicants registered at the French National Unemployment Agency, and resorting to a varied toolkit of statistical methods. We assessed whether unemployed workers in municipalities with a newly created enterprise zone improved their chances of …nding a job compared with unemployed workers living in similar municipalities but where no enterprise zone was created.
Our main results are threefold. Firstly, in line with several studies on enterprise zones, we
showed that zone designation tended to favor municipalities with favorable unobserved characteristics. This is not surprising given that policy makers usually tend to select places that are more likely to carry success or choose places that gather prior favorable conditions for economic development. Secondly, we found that the French EZ program had a small positive impact, which is consistent with previous work on the number of local establishments in enterprise zones (Rathelot and Sillard, 2009 ).
The policy had a short-run impact on the ease with which the local unemployed workers move out of unemployment. This result is robust to a variety of speci…cations and robustness checks and is broadly in line with the previous works in the US that found that enterprise zones had an impact on employment (Papke, 1994 , Lynch and Zax, 2008 , Ham et al., 2011 , although in our case it is rather small. On the other hand, our result contrasts with previous papers which found that it had no impact on employment (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996, Bondonio and Engberg, 2000, Neumark and Kolko, 2010). Lastly, we …nd that the e¤ect is very localized and may be the direct consequence that tax rebates are given in exchange of some locals being hired.
In each municipality in our sample, while on average about 300 unemployed workers …nd a job every semester, enterprise zones only help an additional group of 10 workers to …nd a job over the same duration. It could be argued that this …gure represents a lower bound of the e¤ect of tax exemptions since out-of-the-labor-force residents may also have reacted to these new opportunities.
Because of missing information, some exits to a job may also have been attributed to other types of exits from unemployment.
However, even if the true impact on job creations bene…tting enterprise zone residents is substantially larger than the direct e¤ect on exits from unemployment, the overall impact is likely to be moderate. It is also likely to be small in comparison with the huge cost associated with the policy. In 1997, the …rst year of program implementation, it is estimated that the tax reliefs associated with the policy amounted to e123 million for the whole of France. The wage tax exemption amounted to e59 million (48% of the total of tax reliefs) and bene…ted to 26,000 jobs throughout the country. However, 6,000 of these jobs only were held by residents of enterprise zones (DIV, 2001 ). This means that for each job held by an enterprise zone resident, almost e10,000 were granted in wage tax exemptions, and in some case for workers who were already employed before the start of the policy. A fortiori, the cost associated with the new hire of an enterprise zone resident is thus greater. This argues in favor of designing possibly better targeted, more integrated and more cost-e¤ective policies that operate beyond the sole stimulation of labor demand. Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. The specification is a probit model with the dependent variable being a dummy equal to one if the municipality is designated to receive an EZ (and zero otherwise). The sample is restricted to municipalities with a population between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990. The first and second columns are weighted by the square root of the number of unemployed workers at risk at the beginning of period 8 (1st semester of 1997), and the third column is not weighted. Past municipality effect refers to the average of municipality effects in previous semesters, as estimated in the 1st stage of SPLE (the specification being given by equation 1). We also used alternative specifications including in the set of explanatory variables, for instance: the job density within a 60' radius by public transport, the unemployment rate in 1990, the proportions of Europeans (French excluded), North Africans, Subsaharan Africans and other nationalities. The estimated coefficients were not significant and a Chi-square test did not reject the absence of joint significance. Consequently, we dropped these variables from the specification. Note: The observation unit is a municipality between 8,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. The propensity score is computed as the predicted probability of a municipality to be designated, the predicted probability being obtained from a probit model which estimated coefficients are reported in Table 2 , column (1). Each bracket bound corresponds to the propensity score of a treated municipality, where treated municipalities have been sorted by propensity score in ascending order. Note: The observation unit is a municipality between 8,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. Only municipalities with propensity score above .005 are considered in the control group. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis under the means. The propensity score is computed using Table 2 , column (1). Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. The entry rate (resp. an exit rate) is defined as the number of unemployed workers entering (resp. exiting) during a given semester divided by the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of the period. The entry and exit rates are regressed in first difference on the EZ treatment dummy, the propensity score and year dummies (which are not reported here). We only keep semesters between 1 (2nd semester of 1993) and 12 (1st semester of 1999). The reported number of observations corresponds to first-difference observations and is thus equal to (12 − 1) * 149 = 1628 observations. Estimation method: FGLS with a constant within-municipality unrestricted covariance matrix. Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. We conduct robustness checks to changes of semesters and assess the impact of introducing a specific effect for EZ with a small proportion of the population in the municipality. Semester-specific municipality effects are regressed in first difference on a EZ treatment dummy, the propensity score, year dummies (which are not reported here) and, in the last column only, a EZ treatment dummy interacted with a dummy for the EZ accounting for less than 50% of the population of the municipalities where the EZ is located (referred to as "small-proportion EZ" in the Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. Semester-specific municipality effects are regressed in first difference on a EZ treatment dummy, the propensity score and year dummies (which are not reported here). We only keep semesters between 1 (2nd semester of 1993) and 12 (1st semester of 1999). The number of observations in first difference is reported in the last row of the table. Estimation method: FGLS with a constant within-municipality unrestricted covariance matrix. "Municipalities with an EZ" corresponds to our baseline treatment group and includes 13 municipalities. There are 24 municipalities within 2km of an EZ and 51 municipalities within 3km of an EZ. Note: The exit rates to employment are reported for semesters between 1 (2nd semester of 1993) and 20 (1st semester of 2003). Semester 8 (1st semester of 1997) is the first semester during which some municipalities are treated. High-proportion EZ (resp. low-proportion EZ): municipalities including an EZ which accounts for more (resp. less) than 50% of the population of those municipalities in 1990. Non-EZ: municipalities which do not include an EZ. 8,000-100,000: population between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990.
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